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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The principle that a necessarily false proposition implies any proposition, and that a 
necessarily  true  proposition  is  implied  by  any  proposition,  was  apparently  first 
propounded  in  twelfth  century  Latin  logic,  and  came  to  be  widely,  though  not 
universally, accepted in the fourteenth century. These principles seem never to have 
been  accepted,  or  even  seriously  entertained,  by  Arabic  logicians.  In  the  present 
paper  I  explore  some  thirteenth  century  Arabic  discussions  of  conditionals  with 
impossible antecedents. The Persian-born scholar Afdal al-Dīn al-Khūnajī (d.1248) 
suggested  the  novel  idea  that  two  contradictory  propositions  may  follow  from  the 
same impossible antecedent, and closely related to this point, he suggested that if an 
antecedent  implied  a  consequent,  then  it  would  do  so  no  matter  how  it  was 
strengthened. These ideas led him, and those who followed him, to reject what has 
come to be known as ‘Aristotle’s thesis’ that nothing is implied by its own negation. 
Even  these  suggestions  were  widely  resisted.  Particularly  influential  were  the 
counter-arguments of Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Tūṣī (d.1274).   3
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The principle that a necessarily false proposition implies any proposition, and that a 
necessarily  true  proposition  is  implied  by  any  proposition,  was  apparently  first 
propounded  in  twelfth  century  Latin  logic,  and  came  to  be  widely,  though  not 
universally, accepted in the fourteenth century.1 These principles seem never to have 
been  accepted,  or  even  seriously  entertained,  by  Arabic  logicians.  In  the  present 
paper  I  explore  some  thirteenth  century  Arabic  discussions  of  conditionals  with 
impossible antecedents. Some logicians of the period suggested the novel idea that 
two contradictory propositions may follow from the same impossible antecedent, and 
closely  related  to  this  point,  they  suggested  that  if  an  antecedent  implied  a 
consequent, then it would do so no matter how it was strengthened. These ideas led 
them  to  reject  what  has  come  to  be  known  as  ‘Aristotle’s  thesis’  that  nothing  is 
implied by its own negation. Even these suggestions were, as we shall see, widely 
resisted. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 See Martin 1987; Martin 1986; and the contributions by K. Iwakuma, J. Spruyt, A. d’Ors, and S. Read 
in K. Jacobi 1993.   4
I 
 
Avicenna (d.1037) held the following two conditionals to be logically equivalent:  
 
(1) Always (Kullama): If Every A is B then Every J is D 
(2) Never (Laysa al-batta): If A is B then Not Every J is D  
 
Thus, an affirmative necessary conditional entails a negative necessary conditional 
with the same antecedent and the consequent negated. Though the principle has 
been attributed to Boethius (d.524) it may in fact first have been formulated in the 
Latin  tradition  by  Peter  Abelard  (d.1142).2  It  was  already  clearly  formulated  by 
Avicenna a century earlier. 
The reductio proof Avicenna offered for this view is as follows: Assume that (1) 
is true and (2) is false. Then the contradictory of (2) is true: 
 
(3) Once (Qad yakun): If A is B then Not Every J is D   
 
But  (1)  and  (3)  cannot  both  be  true  since  this  would  mean  that,  assuming  the 
antecedent ‘Every A is B’, it is at least once the case that ‘Not Every J is D’ even 
though,  by  (1),  ‘Every  J  is  D’  is  always  true  when  ‘Every  A  is  B’  is  true.  This  is 
absurd.3  
                                                 
2 See on this point Martin 1991, 303. 
3 Ibn Sīnā, 1037a, 367-8.   5
The prefixing of modal operators to conditionals may strike scholars familiar 
with the Latin logical tradition as odd. It is in fact distinctive of the Avicennian tradition 
of Arabic logic. Avicenna explicitly drew an analogy between these modal operators 
prefixed to conditional propositions and the quantifiers in categorical propositions. 
Proposition  (1)  is  thus  ‘universal’  while  proposition  (3)  is  ‘particular’.  These 
conditional  ‘quantifiers’  are  inter-definable  just  as  the  quantifiers  of  categorical 
propositions: ‘Always’ is equivalent to ‘Not Once Not’ and ‘Once’ is equivalent to ‘Not 
Always Not’.4   
Avicenna’s claim that an affirmative-universal conditional entails a negative-
universal  conditional  with  the  same  antecedent  and  the  contradictory  consequent 
seems to have been accepted until the end of the twelfth century. Fakhr al-Dīn al-
Rāzī (d.1210), for example, expounded it in his Mulakhkhaṣ in a manner suggesting 
that he did not find it problematic or controversial.5 In the early thirteenth century, 
however, the principle was challenged, and the ramifications of its denial explored. 
The first to do so seems to have been Afḍal al-Dīn al-Khūnajī (d.1248), a Persian-
born scholar and judge in Ayyubid Egypt.6 
Khūnajī argued as follows: the same antecedent may imply both a consequent 
and  its  contradictory.  This  can  happen  if  the  antecedent  is  impossible.  Khūnajī 
argued that this is clear from the case of proofs by reductio:  
 
                                                 
4 Ibn Sīnā 1037b, 254. 
5 Rāzī 1210, 232. 
6 I am preparing an edition of Khunaji’s main work on logic Kashf al-asrār. I will defend my vocalization 
of the logician’s name in the introduction.   6
That  something  follows  from  something  does  not  imply  that  its  contradictory 
does not also follow from that thing, for a contradictory pair may follow from the 
same  impossible  antecedent.  Is  a  reductio  syllogism  anything  but  a 
contradictory  pair  both  following  from  the  contradictory  of  the  proposed 
conclusion? The contradictories of most claims in geometry, and for that matter 
in logic itself, imply both something and its contradictory. Scholarly works are 
full of proofs that show that a contradictory pair follows from the contradiction of 
a claim. This is not something obscure so that one needs to expand further.7  
 
Najm  al-Dīn  al-Kātibī  (d.1277),  in  his  commentary  on  Khūnajī’s  work,  did  expand 
further.8 He explicated Khūnajī’s claim as follows: Suppose we wish to prove the 
following valid inference in the second-figure: 
 
(1)   Every J is B 
(2)   No A is B  
(3)   No J is A 
 
We assume the contradictory of the proposed conclusion: 
 
(4)   Some J is A       
 
                                                 
7 Khūnajī 1248, fol.88v. 
8 Kātibī 1277, fol. 145v.   7
We then add the contradictory of the proposed conclusion to the two premises, and 
thus get an argument consisting of three premises. Premises (2) and (4) jointly imply 
(by FERIO):  
 
(5)   Some J is not B       
 
But premise (1), viz. ‘Every J is B’, implies itself.  
 
(6)   Every J is B     
 
The three inconsistent premises (1) (2) and (4) together thus imply both ‘Some J is 
not B’ and ‘Every J is B’.  
For  Khūnajī  and  his  commentator  Kātibī  it  was  apparently  too  obvious  to 
mention  that  by  showing  that  an  inconsistent  set  of  premises  implied  both  a 
proposition and its contradictory, they had also shown that the conditional having the 
premises as antecedent and the contradictory conclusions as consequent was true. 
Khūnajī’s  rejection  of  Avicenna’s  principle  was  accepted  by  some  later 
thirteenth century Arabic logicians. It was explicitly endorsed, for example, by Sirāj al-
Dīn al-Urmawī (d.1283) in his influential advanced handbook of logic Maṭāliʿ al-anwār, 
and by Athīr al-Dīn al-Abharī (d.1265) in his Tanzīl al-afkār.9 It was also accepted by 
Ibn al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī (d.1326) in his commentary on Tajrīd al-manṭiq, a handbook 
                                                 
9 See Taḥtānī 1365a, 160 (margin); and Ṭūṣī 1274, 170.   8
on  logic  by  his  teacher  Naṣīr  al-Dīn  al-Ṭūṣī  (d.1274)  –  this  being  one  of  the  few 
occasions on which Ḥillī expressed disagreement with his teacher.10 
 
 
II 
 
In  exploring  some  of  the  ramifications  of  Khūnajī’s  argument,  a f e w  c o n t e x t u a l  
remarks may be helpful: 
Medieval Arabic logicians in the Avicennist tradition – a tradition which had 
achieved a position of predominance by the thirteenth century and which includes all 
the  logicians  discussed  here  –  distinguished  between  ‘coincidental’  (ittifāqī)  and 
‘implicative’ (luzūmī) conditionals. The former were sometimes presented as being 
truth-functional, but then in the sense of being true if and only if both antecedent and 
consequent were true, or alternatively if and only if the consequent was true. The 
latter, which were clearly much more interesting to medieval Arabic logicians, were 
generally understood to involve  a necessary connection – causal or conceptual – 
between the antecedent and the consequent. Hence it could be false even if both 
antecedent and consequent were true. The necessary falsity of the antecedent was 
not sufficient for the truth of the conditional. 
The same term, luzūm (which I translate as ‘implication’), was used to denote 
both  the  relation  between  antecedent  and  consequent  in  a  true  ‘implicative’ 
conditional, and the relation between premises and conclusion in a valid argument. In 
                                                 
10 Hillī 1325, 87.   9
other contexts, Arabic logicians did make the expected distinction between luzūm by 
virtue of form and luzūm by virtue of matter, and there is nothing to suggest that they 
failed to recognise that in the standard example of an ‘implicative’ conditional – ‘If the 
sun is up then it is day’ – the antecedent does not formally imply the consequent. 
However,  they  obviously  did  not  think  that  it  was  always  important  to  mark  the 
distinction. Thus the antecedent in a true implicative conditional was said simply to 
‘imply’  the  consequent  and  the  consequent  to  ‘be  implied  by’  the  antecedent. 
Likewise, the premises in a valid argument was said to ‘imply’ the conclusion and the 
conclusion to be ‘implied’ by the premises. In what follows, I will follow the sources in 
using  the  term  ‘implication’  in  this  broad  sense,  and  not  merely  to  denote  formal 
implication.    
As  mentioned  above,  two  modal  operators  –  ‘Always’  and  ‘Once’  –  were 
prefixed  to  the  conditionals.  These  were  explicitly  taken  to  correspond  to  the 
universal and particular quantifier in categorical propositions: a ‘universal’ conditional 
would hence look like this:11 
 
Always: If P then Q 
 
A ‘particular’ conditional would look like this: 
 
Once: If P then Q 
                                                 
11 For simplicity, I use propositional variables (P,Q) and propositional constants (p,q) in what follows. 
The sources do not do this, confining symbols to the level of terms, as in ‘Always: If A is B then J is D’.    10
 
These  modal  operators  were  thought  to  be  logically  related  as  the  quantifiers  of 
categorical  propositions:  ‘Always’  is  equivalent  to  ‘Not  Once  Not’;  ‘Not  Always’  to 
‘Once Not’; ‘Once’ to ‘Not Always Not’. As is the case with categorical propositions, 
an affirmative-universal conditional was held to convert to an affirmative-particular 
proposition. Thus, the conditional ‘Always: If this is a human then this is an animal’ 
converted to ‘Once: If this is an animal then this is human’.   
In  the  ‘particular’  implicative  conditional,  the  antecedent  implies  the 
consequent if conjoined with the truth of another proposition. For example, ‘Once: If 
this is an animal then this is human’ is true, since the truth of the antecedent ‘This is 
an animal’ will imply the truth of the consequent if we conjoin it to another proposition, 
such as ‘This is rational’. By contrast, in the ‘universal’ implicative conditional, the 
truth  of  the  antecedent  alone  implies  (materially  or  formally)  the  truth  of  the 
consequent. An example would be the conditional ‘Always: If this is human then this 
is an animal’. The truth of the consequent follows from the truth of the antecedent in 
all situations in which the antecedent is true, or to put it differently: the truth of the 
consequent follows from the truth of the antecedent alone, no matter if and how the 
antecedent is strengthened.  
At  this  point,  one  of  the  ramifications  of  Khūnajī’s  argument  becomes 
apparent. Avicenna had argued that it was strictly speaking false to say that, in a true 
universal implicative conditional, the consequent follows in all situations in which the 
antecedent is true. What about situations in which the antecedent is strengthened 
with another proposition that is inconsistent with the consequent? Surely that is a   11
situation in which the original antecedent is true but the consequent does not follow? 
For example, the situation in which ‘this is human’ is true but ‘this is not a self-moving 
and perceiving thing’ is also true, is one in which it does not follow that ‘this is an 
animal’  is  true.  The  characterisation  should  therefore  be  amended  to  be:  the 
consequent  follows  in  any  possible  situation  in  which  the  antecedent  is  true,  or 
alternatively: the consequent follows the antecedent regardless of what propositions 
compatible with the antecedent are used to strengthen the antecedent.  
Matters are a bit more complicated than this, since Avicenna drew a distinction 
between a conditional being true in fact (fī nafs al-amr) and its being supposed true 
for  purposes  of  forcing  a  conclusion  on  an  opponent  in  debate  (bi’l-ilzām).  For 
example: the conditional ‘If 5 is even then it is a number’ is true for purposes of 
argument, in the sense that someone who accepts the antecedent ‘5 is even’ and the 
suppressed  premise  ‘Everything  that  is  even  is  a  number’,  must  accept  the 
conclusion. It is false in fact because the antecedent and the suppressed premise are 
actually incompatible (since the even 5 is not a number, and no number is an even 
5).  Avicenna seems to have held that an affirmative conditional is only true fī nafs al-
amr if it can be reformulated as a true affirmative categorical proposition: 
 
If our statement ‘If five is even then it is a number’ were true and should be 
conceded  in  itself,  then  it  would  be  true  to  say  ‘What  is  an  even  five  is a 
number’. Since this is false, then the conditional that is equipollent to it must 
be false too. And if this categorical proposition [i.e. ‘What is an even five is a   12
number’] were true, then its converse – that some number is an even five – 
would be true.12 
 
The upshot of the distinction seems to be the following: The antecedent of a 
universal affirmative conditional that is true in fact must be at least possible. In this 
case, the objection that one may strengthen the antecedent with a proposition that is 
incompatible with the consequent cannot arise. For example, it cannot be objected to 
the universal truth of ‘If 4 is even then it is a number’ that one may strengthen the 
antecedent with the proposition ‘4 is not a number’, in which case the consequent 
would not follow in all situations in which the antecedent is true. For the purported 
counter-example – and any other such counter-example – is false since it has an 
impossible  antecedent.  By  contrast,  a  conditional  that  is  true  for  the  purpose  of 
argument  may  have  an  impossible  antecedent.  To  avoid  the  position  that  no 
universal  conditional  is  true  for  the  purpose  of  argument,  since  we  can  always 
strengthen  the  antecedent  with  a  proposition  that  is  not  compatible  with  the 
consequent,  we  need  to  stipulate  that  the  proposition  used  to  strengthen  the 
antecedent is compatible with it.13   
Khūnajī seems to have ignored this distinction between a conditional being true 
in  fact  and  for  the  purposes  of  argument,  and  he  expressed  reservations  about 
Avicenna’s proposed amendment. The impossible situation in which ‘this is human’ 
                                                 
12 Ibn Sīnā, 1037a, 240. 
13 The distinction between truth fī nafs al-amr and bi’l-ilzām is introduced in Ibn Sīnā 1037a, 239-241. It 
is brought to bear on the problem of strengthening antecedents with propositions that are incompatible 
with the consequent in ibid, 273-275.   13
and ‘this is not an animal’ are both true is not a situation in which it does not follow 
that ‘this is an animal’ is true. The impossible antecedent ‘this is human & this is not 
an animal’ implies both the consequent ‘this is an animal’ and its contradictory ‘this is 
not an animal’. As his commentator Kātibī put it:  
 
We do not concede that if we assume the antecedent with the non-existence of 
the  consequent  then  the  consequent  does  not  follow  but  instead  the  non-
existence of the consequent follows, nor that this [viz. that the non-existence of 
the consequent follows] necessitates the non-following of the consequent that is 
opposed to the affirmative implicative conditional. It is possible that both of a 
contradictory pair follow from an impossible antecedent.14  
 
Similarly with the particular conditional: Such a conditional is true if the antecedent 
(formally  or  materially)  implies  the  consequent  when  strengthened  with  another 
proposition.  But  unless  we  stipulate  that  the  additional  proposition  must  be 
compatible  with  the  original  antecedent,  it  would  seem  that  any  proposition  will 
partially  imply  any  other  proposition,  and  that  no  universal-negative  implicative 
conditional could be true. Khūnajī and Kātibī were – as we will see – willing to accept 
this conclusion.    
Another  ramification  of  Khūnajī’s  argument  becomes  apparent  in  the 
discussion  of  hypothetical  syllogisms.  Following  Avicenna,  the  majority  of  Arabic 
logicians  came  to  accept  what  they  called  ‘conjoined’  or  ‘combinatorial’  (iqtirānī) 
                                                 
14 Kātibī 1277, fol. 140r.   14
hypothetical syllogisms. A subclass of these conjoined hypothetical syllogisms is the 
syllogism  consisting  of  two  conditional  premises  in  which  the  antecedent  or 
consequent  of  one  premise  is  an  antecedent  or  consequent  of  the  second.  For 
example: 
 
If P then Q 
If Q then R 
If P then R 
 
Such  purely  hypothetical  syllogisms  were  contrasted  with  the  so-called  ‘repetitive’ 
(istithnā’ī)  syllogisms  –  the  latter  corresponding  to  the  familiar  Stoic  schemata  in 
which a proposition mentioned in the conditional premise is affirmed or negated (and 
in this sense ‘repeated’) in the other premise.  
Avicennian  logicians  claimed  that  the  conditions  for  validity  in  hypothetical 
syllogisms of the type mentioned were identical to the conditions for the validity of 
categorical syllogisms. For example, if the consequent of the first premise was the 
antecedent of the second premise, then one had a first-figure syllogism that was valid 
if and only if the minor premise was affirmative and the major universal.  
This had ramifications for Khūnajī’s claim. As pointed out by Khūnajī’s student 
Ibn  Wāṣil  al-Ḥamawī  (d.1298),  it  was  possible  to  defend  Avicenna’s  principle  by 
constructing an indirect proof in the third figure of the hypothetical syllogism: The 
truth of the universal conditional (1) ‘Always: If A is B then J is D’ implied the truth of 
the negative universal conditional (2) ‘Never: If A is B then J is not D’; otherwise the   15
contradictory of the proposed negative universal conditional would be true (3) ‘Once: 
If A is B then J is not D’. However, (1) and (3) imply (by FELAPTON) ‘Once: If J is D 
then  J  is  not  D’.  This  conclusion  is,  or  so  the  argument  goes,  absurd  –  being  a 
contradiction of what has come to be known as Aristotle’s Thesis15 that nothing is 
implied by its own negation. Ibn Wāṣil, following his teacher Khūnajī, responded by 
denying Aristotle’s Thesis: 
 
We say: We do not concede that our statement ‘Once: If J is D then J is not D’ 
is false, since it may be the case that the antecedent is impossible and truly 
imply the impossible.16 
 
Indeed,  Khūnajī  had  adduced  an  independent  argument  to  show  that  a  particular 
affirmative conditional of the form ‘Once: if P then Q’ is always true.17 Take any two 
propositions  p  and  q.  It  is  possible  to  construct  the  following  valid  third-figure 
syllogism consisting of true premises: 
 
Always: if p & q then p 
Always: if p & q then q 
Once: if p then q 
 
                                                 
15 McCall, 1966. 
16 Ibn Wāsil 1298, fol. 47v. 
17 Khūnajī 1248, fol. 126v.   16
If one accepts that an impossible antecedent may imply both a consequent and its 
contradictory,  then  it  ceases  to  matter  whether  p  and  q  are  incompatible  or 
contradictory. It is thus possible to formulate the argument as follows:18 
 
Always: if P & not-P then P 
Always: if P & not-P then not-P  
Once: if P then not-P  
 
 
III 
 
The argument constructed by Khūnajī was obviously viewed as paradoxical by many 
later  logicians.  The  late  fourteenth-century  Persian  scholar  al-Sayyid  al-Sharīf  al-
Jurjānī (d.1413), in a work that was probably read by most students in the Islamic 
world for half a millennium, gave a summary of the problem:  
 
In this connection the following point has been established: It can be said that 
one of three things must be the case: (i) Either the whole does not imply the 
part; (ii) or a third-figure syllogism consisting of conditional premises is invalid; 
or (iii) a partial implication obtains between any two facts whatsoever and it 
                                                 
18 Taḥtānī 1365b, 137.    17
follows that the universal negative implicative conditional is not true regardless 
of the matter.19 
 
Most  of  the  later  logicians  who  were  unhappy  with  Khūnajī’s  argument  chose  to 
accept the first of the seemingly paradoxical options listed by Jurjānī. Naṣīr al-Dīn al-
Ṭūṣī  (d.1274),  for  example,  rejected  the  position  that  a  conjunctive  antecedent 
implies either conjunct: 
 
The following of a part from a sum of parts is not a true instance of implication 
but is rather a repeated utterance. If we say ‘If this is a writer and a laugher’ we 
do not doubt that his being a writer does not necessitate his being a laugher, 
and has no connection with it … so its occurrence in the antecedent is, with 
regards  to  implication,  extrinsic  and  superfluous  (ajnabiyyun  wa  ḥashwun 
maḥḍ) … Thus the proposition is really tantamount to saying ‘If this is a laugher 
[then this is a laugher]’ which is like saying ‘The laugher is a laugher’ – neither 
deserves to be considered a proposition.20 
 
Ṭūṣī thus distinguished between the uttered antecedent and the real antecedent. He 
used this distinction to diagnose what was wrong with the paradoxical hypothetical 
third-figure syllogism: 
 
                                                 
19 Jurjānī 1413, 137. 
20 Ṭūṣī 1274, 173.   18
Always: If this is a human and a horse then this is a human 
Always: If this is a human and a horse then this is a horse 
Once: If this is a human then this is a horse 
 
In the first premise it is the first conjunct of the antecedent (this is a human) that 
alone implies the consequent, and the second conjunct (this is a horse) is irrelevant 
to the obtaining of the consequent. Similarly, in the second premise it is the second 
conjunct of the antecedent (this is a horse) alone that implies the consequent, and 
the  first  conjunct  (this  is  a  human)  is  irrelevant.  The  fact  that  a  middle  term  is 
mentioned (yatakarrar lafẓan) is misleading. On the level of ‘meanings’ or ‘intentions’ 
(maʿānī) there is no middle term.21 
  The diagnosis does not itself reveal whether Ṭūṣī believed that the premises of 
the hypothetical syllogism are false or whether they are true but do not ‘really’ have a 
middle term. The following analogy that he drew with categorical syllogisms clearly 
shows that he believed the premises to be false:  By the same token, he argued, one 
should be able to construct the following categorical syllogism in the third figure: 
 
Every human and horse is a human 
Every human and horse is a horse 
Some humans are horses 
 
                                                 
21 Ṭūṣī 1274, 215-6.   19
The conclusion is clearly false, and since Ṭūṣī explicitly stated that the syllogism was 
formally  valid,  he  must  have  held  the  premises  to  be  false.  His d i a g n o s i s  o f  t h e  
problem is analogous to the case of the troublesome hypothetical syllogism: in the 
first  premise,  it  is  the  first  conjunct  of  the  subject-term  (human)  that  calls  for  an 
affirmative  relation  to  the  predicate,  and  in  the  second  premise  it  is  the  second 
conjunct (horse). There is no middle term except in utterance. 
Ṭūṣī’s analogy with a categorical syllogism in the third-figure seems, at least at 
first sight, to overlook a significant difference between categorical and conditional 
propositions. It was generally agreed that affirmative categorical propositions have 
existential import, and hence are not true if the subject does not exist, actually or 
possibly. Kātibī mentioned precisely the same third-figure categorical syllogism, and 
he  too  believed  the  syllogism  to  be  formally  valid  and  the  conclusion  false.  His 
diagnosis  of  the  problem  with  the  premises,  however,  was  different  and  arguably 
more straightforward: they are both false since there is nothing corresponding to the 
subject-terms.22 By contrast, it was generally accepted that conditionals could be true 
even  if  their  antecedent  was  impossible.  Ṭūṣī,  however,  argued  that  impossible 
antecedents should, strictly speaking, be treated analogously to impossible subjects. 
Strictly speaking, nothing follows from impossible antecedents, just as nothing can be 
predicated of impossible subjects.  
 
The impossible (al-muḥāl) insofar as it is impossible, and even the non-existent 
insofar as it is non-existent, cannot be judged to imply something, but can be 
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judged not to imply something. Just as the subject, insofar as it does not exist, 
cannot be the subject of an affirmative judgement, but all things can be negated 
of it.23 
 
Ṭūṣī’s  position  is  more  flexible  than  this  quotation  suggests,  since  he  accepted 
Avicenna’s distinction between conditionals being true de facto and being true for the 
purposes of argument. A conditional cannot be true de facto if it has an impossible 
antecedent, but it may still be true for the purposes of argument. His diagnosis is 
meant to disarm the conclusion when the premises are taken as true in the latter 
sense.  
Ṭūṣī was also dismissive of attempts to question Avicenna’s principle that an 
affirmative universal conditional (Always: If P then Q) implied a negative universal 
conditional with the same antecedent and the negated consequent (Never: If P then 
not-Q). In his Taʿdīl al-miʿyār he tried to rebut the following statement by Athīr al-Dīn 
al-Abharī (d.1265): ‘The mind cannot be certain that implying a negation implies the 
negation of implication, for the antecedent of the conditional could be impossible, and 
the impossible may imply two contradictories’. In other words, Abharī – presumably 
following Khūnajī – doubted whether ‘If P then not-Q’ implied ‘Not: If P then Q’, since 
if the antecedent P is impossible then it could imply both not-Q and Q. To this, Ṭūṣī 
replied: 
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If an impossible antecedent’s implying two contradictories were to undermine 
[the  principle]  that  the  implication  of  a  negative  [consequent]  implies  the 
negation of the implication of an affirmative [consequent] – by its being the case 
that it both implies the negation of the implication of the affirmative [consequent] 
(insofar  as  it  necessitates  the  implication  of  the  negative  [consequent])  and 
does not imply it (insofar as it necessitates the implication of the affirmative 
[consequent])  –  then  it  should  firstly  undermine  the  very  implication  of  the 
negative [consequent] that is conjoined with the implication of the affirmative 
[consequent]. For the following of two opposing [propositions] is the cause of 
this conjoining of implication and non-implication, and undermining the corrupt 
effect and not the cause that necessitates it is indefensible.24 
 
Abharī took the position that ‘If P then not-Q’ and ‘If P then Q’ can both be true in 
case P is impossible, and that this shows that implying a negation (If P then not-Q) is 
not logically equivalent to not implying (Not: If P then Q). To this Ṭūṣī responded by 
arguing that to accept that ‘If P then not-Q’ and ‘If P then Q’ could both be true should 
be taken as showing that neither not-Q nor Q are implied by the antecedent P. The 
possibility that the same antecedent P can imply both Q and not-Q should undermine 
the very principle of universal implication.  
 
Rather,  what  should  be  rejected  here  is  implication  itself,  because  of  the 
possibility of the implication of two contradictories. Instead of what he [Abharī] 
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said, he should have said, ‘The mind cannot be certain (lā jazma li’l-ʿaql) of 
something being implied by something in the first place, for the antecedent of 
the  conditional  may  be  impossible,  and  the  impossible  may  imply t w o  
contradictories’.  In  this  manner,  the  door  of  implication  would  be  closed 
universally (bi’l-kulliyah).25 
 
Ṭūṣī thus argued that if Abharī were right, and ‘If P then not-Q’ and ‘If P then Q’ could 
both be true, then there would not be such a thing as universal (kullī) implication, and 
any conditional of the form ‘Always: if P then Q’ would be false.  
 
IV 
 
Ṭūṣī’s rejection of the idea that an antecedent could imply both a proposition and its 
contradictory, and his diagnosis of what was wrong with the problematic third-figure 
hypothetical  syllogism  of  Khūnajī,  had  a  significant  impact  on  the  later  logical 
tradition.  
On the first of these points: it seems to have been because of criticisms such as 
Ṭūṣī’s that Abharī’s student Kātibī, who is known to have corresponded with Ṭūṣī on 
philosophical  and  logical  matters,  presented  a  somewhat  modified  account  of 
Khūnajī’s  and  Abharī’s  position.26  In  his  commentary  on  Khūnajī’s  Kashf  al-asrār, 
                                                 
25 Ṭūṣī 1274, 170. 
26 Many modern scholars, including N. Rescher in his The Development of Arabic Logic (Rescher 
1964, 203-4), have been misled by the statement of the 17th century Ottoman bibliographer Katip 
Çelebi (d.1657) to the effect that Kātibī was Ṭūṣī’s student. Kātibī was, by his own testimony, a student   23
Kātibī  held  that  Khūnajī’s  criticism  of  Avicenna  overlooked  Avicenna’s  distinction 
between  a  conditional  being  true  in  fact  (fī  nafs  al-amr)  and  for  the  purpose  of 
argument (bi’l-ilzām). He pointed out that it was specifically of conditionals being true 
in the second sense that Avicenna had insisted that the situations relevant to the 
truth of the universal conditional be those compatible with the antecedent. Unless we 
made this specification, accepting the antecedent would not commit someone to also 
accepting the consequent, and thus no universal conditional would be true bi’l-ilzām: 
 
In  other  words,  we  shall  not  be  able  to  force  someone  to  concede  its  [the 
conditional’s] truth. For if for example we claim that it is true that ‘Always: If this 
is human…’, in any situation or with any supposition, regardless of whether this 
situation or condition possibly coexists with it [the antecedent] or not ‘…then it is 
an animal’, then it will be said: We do not concede its truth in the manner you 
have claimed, for one of the situations and conditions is not being an animal 
(ʿadam al-ḥayawaniyya) or being an animal not following from it (ʿadam luzūm 
al-ḥayawāniyya  iyyāh).  If  you  take  it  [the  conditional]  with  these  two 
considerations, then we do not concede that being an animal is implied by it 
[the antecedent].27 
 
Kātibī agreed with Avicenna (and Ṭūṣī) on this point. He also agreed with Avicenna 
that this stipulation was not necessary in the case of universal conditionals that were 
                                                                                                                                                    
of Abharī’s. Katip Çelebi seems not to have been particularly well-informed on this point, and the date 
of death that he gives for Kātibī is obviously a guess and in fact two decades off the mark. 
27 Kātibī 1277, fol.139v.   24
true  in  fact.  Such  conditionals  remain  true  regardless  of  how  we  strengthen t h e  
antecedent. The de facto truth of ‘Always: If the sun is up then it is day’ is not affected 
by situations that are incompatible with the antecedent (such as ‘The sun is up and it 
is  not  day’)  that  could  be  used  to  construct  a  counterexample  to  the  original 
conditional (‘Always: If the sun is up and it is not day then it is not day’). Avicenna 
defended this position by claiming that any such counter-example with ‘strengthened’ 
antecedent and contradictory consequent would be false, since the ‘strengthened’ 
antecedent was impossible, and any conditional with an impossible antecedent was 
de facto false. Kātibī’s reason for rejecting such counterexamples was different – he 
may have wished to allow for conditionals that had an impossible antecedent but 
were nevertheless de facto true. Instead, he followed Khūnajī in maintaining that the 
conditionals with strengthened and impossible antecedents simply did not contradict 
the original conditional:  
 
If someone were to falsify the truth of the universal conditional that is true in fact 
… as when someone says: ‘It is not true that whenever the sun is up then it is 
day’, and argues that if we take the sun being up with its not being day, or with 
it not following that it is day, then it does not follow that it is day – we deny that 
this [counter-] conditional is true. And if he claims that not being day follows it in 
such cases, then we concede this and deny that it contradicts our statement 
‘Always:  if  the  sun  is  up  then  it  is  day’.  All  that  we  concede  i s  t h a t  i f  b o t h  
conditionals are true then its being day and its not being day both follow from 
the  sun  being  up  in  some  situations  and  according  to  some  suppositions.   25
However, it is not known that this is impossible, since it is possible that these 
situations  and  suppositions  are  impossible,  and  it  is  not  excluded  that  an 
impossibility implies another impossibility.28 
 
Why did Kātibī not use the same Khūnajī-inspired diagnosis for purported counter-
examples to universal conditionals that are held to be true bi’l-ilzām? He seems to 
have reasoned as follows: A universal conditional that is true bi’l-ilzām is such that 
someone who accepts the antecedent must be able to see that she must also accept 
the consequent. Suppose we put forward such a universal conditional: ‘Always: If P 
then Q’. A counter-example to the universal truth of such a conditional would be: 
‘Always:  If  P  and  not-Q  then  not-Q’.  In  this  dialectic  context,  it  would  not  do  to 
concede  that  the  counterexample  is  true  but  does  not  contradict  the  original 
conditional, for the counterexample does not contradict the original conditional only if 
the original conditional is universally true, and this is precisely the point at issue. By 
conceding the truth of the counterexample, we have cast doubt on the truth of the 
original  universal  conditional,  and  shall  not  be  able  to  show  that  someone  who 
accepts the antecedent must also accept the consequent.  
 
If we claim that it is true that ‘Always: if a number is two then it is even’ without 
adding  the  condition  that  the  situations  and  conditions  that  are supposed  to 
obtain  be  compatible  with  it  but  rather  unconditionally  …  and  it  is  said  [in 
objection]: one of these situations is it [the number two] not being divisible into 
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equals, and if you take it [the conditional] with this supposition then we do not 
concede that being even is implied by it [the number two] … Thus there are 
situations such that if we suppose them to obtain with the antecedent of the 
conditional  then  the  following  of  the  consequent  in  such  cases  would  be 
unknown  …  and  hence  it  is  not  the  case  that  whenever  we  suppose  the 
antecedent to obtain we can say with certainty (najzim) that the consequent 
follows.29   
 
A  similar  line  was  taken  by  Shams  al-Dīn  al-Samarqandī  (fl.  1283-91)  in  his 
commentary  on  his  own  summa  of  logic  Qusṭās  al-afkār.  Discussing  Avicenna’s 
stipulation  that  the  situations  relevant  to  assessing  the  truth  of  the  universal 
affirmative conditional are those compatible with the antecedent, Samarqandī wrote:    
 
They have objected to Avicenna that we do not concede that the consequent 
does  not  follow  the  antecedent  if  we  suppose  the  antecedent  with  the  non-
obtaining  of  the  consequent  or  with  the  non-following  of  the  consequent.  At 
most,  the  non-obtaining  of  the  consequent,  or  the  non-following  of  the 
consequent, follows [such strengthened antecedents] but it does not follow from 
this that the [original] consequent does not follow from the [original] antecedent. 
It is possible that something imply two contradictories if that thing is impossible. 
The conjunction of that which implies something and the contradictory of that 
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[implied] thing implies both that which implies something and its contradictory, 
as is the case in reductio syllogisms.30  
 
Having  presented  Khūnajī’s  objection,  Samarqandī  proceeded  to  present  Kātibī’s 
modified defense of Avicenna’s stipulation: 
 
The answer is that what is claimed is that if it is not stipulated that the these 
matters  [the  situations  that  are  supposed  to  obtain  with  the  antecedent]  are 
compatible with the antecedent, then one cannot say with certainty (lam yahṣul 
al-jazm)  that  the  conditional  is  true  as  a  universal.  If  we  suppose  the  non-
obtaining of the consequent, or the non-following of the consequent, to obtain 
with the antecedent, then it may be that the consequent does not follow from it 
[the  original  antecedent],  for  the  impossible  antecedent  may  imply  two 
contradictories, but does not necessarily do so … With this possibility it is not 
possible to say with certainty (imtanaʿa al-jazm) that the conditional is true as a 
universal. It is thus known that it must be stipulated that these matters [viz. the 
situations that are supposed to obtain with the antecedent] be compatible with 
the antecedent.31  
 
Ṭūṣī’s  diagnosis  of  what  was  wrong  with  the  problematic  third-figure 
hypothetical syllogism of Khūnajī was also echoed in later Arabic logical writings. It 
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was cited, for example, by the fourteenth-century North African scholar Muḥammad 
al-Sharīf al-Tilimsānī (d.1370), one of the teachers of the well-known historian Ibn 
Khaldūn (d.1406), in his commentary on Khūnajī’s shortest work on logic al-Jumal. 
Al-Sharīf al-Tilimsānī quoted verbatim from Ṭūṣī’s Taʿdīl al-miʿyār and noted that this 
was  the  counter-argument  to  Khūnajī  of  ‘those  who  are  inordinately  partisan  to 
Avicenna (al-mutaʿaṣṣibūn li’l-Shaykh)’.32  
Ṭūṣī’s  arguments  were  also  echoed  by  the  very  influential  Timurid  scholar, 
Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī (d.1390). Commenting on the following two conditionals that 
could be adduced to show that an antecedent may imply both a proposition and its 
contradictory: 
 
Always: If something is human and non-human then it is human 
Always: If something is human and non-human then it is non-human 
 
Taftāzānī wrote: 
 
We do not concede that the two premises are true. They would be true if each 
part of the antecedent were relevant to the obtaining of the implication (dakhl fī 
iqtiḍāʾ al-luzūm). It is clear that humanity has nothing to with the implication of 
non-humanity,  nor  has  non-humanity  anything  to  do  with  the  implication  of 
humanity. Yes, this would be true with respect to what one is forced to concede 
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(bi-hasab al-ilzām) but we are speaking of what is true in fact (bi-ḥasab nafs al-
amr).33      
 
However,  Khūnajī’s  argument  was  by  no  means  universally  rejected  in  later 
centuries.  It  was  accepted,  for  example,  by  Masʿūd  al-Shirwānī  (d.1499)  in  his 
influential commentary on the widely used handbook on dialectic (ādāb al-baḥth) by 
the previously mentioned Shams al-Dīn al-Samarqandī. Shirwānī wrote:  
 
B e t w e e n  a n y  t w o  f a c t s  ( amrayn),  even  contradictories,  there  is  a  partial 
implication. This has been shown by a proof in the third figure: Whenever the 
collective (majmūʿ) of two facts obtains then one of them obtains. Whenever 
the collective obtains the other obtains. This produces: It may be that if one of 
the two obtains the other obtains.34     
 
 
V 
 
Neither those who embraced Khūnajī’s arguments, nor those who opposed them, 
seem to have countenanced the principle that anything follows from an impossible 
                                                 
33 Taftāzānī 1390, p. 110. 
34 Shirwānī 1499, fol.8r. The influence of this work is clear from the bibliographic compilation of the 
Ottoman scribe Katip Çelebi, who states that Samarqandī’s treatise was the most used handbook on 
dialectic  in  his  time,  and  that  Masʿūd  al-Shirwānī’s  commentary  on  it  was  the  best-known  of  the 
commentaries, and itself became the subject of several super-commentaries by later scholars. See 
Katip Çelebi 1657, 1:207.    30
proposition. Khūnajī’s paradoxical third-figure hypothetical syllogism is phrased in a 
manner that does not explicitly challenge the assumption that there must be some 
relevance between premises and conclusion or between antecedent and consequent 
in an implicative conditional. Yet even the principle of ‘simplification’ that he used (i.e. 
inferring either conjunct from a conjunction), and the principle of ‘monotonicity’ that 
he defended (i.e. that if premises implied a conclusion they would do so regardless of 
what propositions were added to the premises), were too much for many later Arabic 
logicians. Following Ṭūṣī, they rejected simplification and demanded that all conjuncts 
in  the  antecedent  be  relevant  to  the  obtaining  of  the  consequent  –  and  that  all 
premises in an argument be relevant to the conclusion – before they would concede 
that this constituted a true implicative conditional, or a valid inference.       31
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